# **Chapter 3**

## **3.1 Introduction**

A more detailed examination of USafeB’s proposed approach and design decisions is presented in this chapter. Section 3.2 consists of a general description of the project as well as showcasing its logical flow. Section 3.3 explores the system’s targeted features in detail, in addition to demonstrating its functional and non-functional requirements as well as the assumptions it places. Section 3.4 explores key design decisions that were made and describes the process behind their selection. Section 3.5 illustrates USafeB’s architecture. Section 3.6 contains the detailed design using UML diagramming.

## **3.2 Design Overview**

USafeB’s design philosophy is derived from the original requirement of having an isolated sandbox for USB devices. The goal for an isolated middleware to mediate between a host computer and a USB device is achieved by creating a circuit which ensures that the host will only be able to gain access to a device only if it’s provided with the middleware’s permission.

Once a user connects their USB device on USafeB’s hardware, it remains logically disconnected from their host device until USafeB’s hardware issues the appropriate commands to the modules which physically conduct the separation. It is then the host computer will be allowed to access the device’s data. This is done without the hardware itself behaving is a tunnel between the two devices. Once permission is granted, a direct connection between the host and the USB device will be enabled. If there is anything that the user wishes to extract from a USB device that was deemed unsafe, the files on the device itself will be rendered unexecutable so that the direct connection can still be established.

Using USafeB will offer users a safe USB security solution that’s portable across all platforms and is easy to deploy. This is especially true in regards to computer users who are not so as to properly secure their own devices, accommodating them is one of the primary goals of USafeB. They receive a prepackaged system that simply receives a USB drive, scans it, gives the red or green light, then offers safe file exchange functionality, or forwards the entire drive.

## **3.3 System Features**

### 3.3.1 Requirements Overview

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Actors** | **Description** |
| Logically separated hardware circuit | The circuit design should allow the USB device to be examined in isolation from the host computer until permission for connection is established. |
| Software scanning mechanism | The middleware should have the ability to detect multiple attacks successfully so as to not allow malicious files to go unnoticed. |
| The ability to connect to the Internet | The user must be able networking capabilities in order to perform an up-to-date scanning operation. |
| Retrieval mechanism for unmalicious files | The middleware should have the ability to forward unmalicious files from an unsafe drive without harming the host device. |

(Table 3.1: An overview of the project’s requirements)

### 3.3.2 Functional Requirements

1. USafeB should be able to connect to the Internet.
2. USafeB should have a reliable scanning/filtering mechanism that could be used successfully to defend against malicious attack vectors.
3. USafeB should be able to forward files that are allowed and deny files which are not.
4. USafeB should implement defenses against attacks described in Table 4, Chapter 2.

### 3.3.3 Non-functional Requirements

1. USafeB should operate independently, regardless of the user’s target platform.
2. USafeB should be simple to use, not requiring elaborative user interaction.

### 3.3.4 Assumptions

1. Faithful host and safe drivers: USafeB assumes that there are no flaws in the host device which it's connected to.
2. Trusted user: USafeB assumes that the user will not attempt to modify the device itself with malicious intent.

## **3.4 Design Analysis**

### 3.4.1 Hardware Considerations

Single board computer manufacturers, such as Raspberry[], Beagleboard[], UDOO[] among others, are fairly competitive. The decision to select Raspberry as USafeB’s sandbox hardware was made upon the following considerations:

* Local availability in the Egyptian market
* Best community support among other options

And among the Raspberry products, there are several models that were surveyed to determine the best for USafeB as displayed in Table 6..

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Raspberry Pi Model** | **USB Ports** | **CPU** | **RAM** | **Price (EGP)** |
| Raspberry Pi 1 B | 2x USB 2.0 | 700MHz | 512MB | Unavailable |
| Raspberry Pi 1 B+ | 4x USB 2.0 | 700MHz | 512MB | Unavailable |
| Raspberry Pi 1 A+ | 1x USB 2.0 | 700MHz | 512MB | Unavailable |
| Raspberry Pi 2 | 4x USB 2.0 | 900MHz | 1GB | Unavailable |
| Raspberry Pi Zero | 1x micro-USB | 1GHz | 512MB | 500 |
| Raspberry Pi 3 | 4x USB 2.0 | 1.2GHz | 1GB | 1200 |
| Raspberry Pi Zero W | 1x micro-USB | 1GHz | 512MB | 550 |
| Raspberry Pi 3 B+ | 4x USB 2.0 | 1.4GHz | 1GB | 1500 |
| Raspberry Pi 3 A+ | 1x USB 2.0 | 1.4GHz | 512MB | 1300 |
| Raspberry Pi 4 | 2x USB 2.0 +  2x USB 3.0 | 1.5GHz | 1GB, 2GB, or 4GB | 1120 |

(Table 3.2: List of Raspberry Pi models and their specifications, along with their availability in the Egyptian markets)

The required model’s selection was based on the following considerations:

* **High performance**: One of the primary goals of USafeB is to provide a portable, platform-independent device to protect USB hosts against malicious external attacks, and for that to yield the highest performance results, it would be preferable to use the fastest and latest processor.
* **RAM**: The Pi’s operating system will reside on an external SD card, but a moderately high amount of RAM is still required for encryption features USafeB is going to implement.
* **USB ports**: While USB 3.0 ports might not be needed for immediate purposes, it is necessary to have for purposes of forward compatibility so that USafeB can eventually be improved to support and be tested on USB 3.0.
* **Price considerations**: Despite performance requirements, the goal is still to design a system that should become affordable. In which case, compromises should be made if possible, and unnecessary features should not be paid for.

Raspberry Pi 4 Model B (1GHz) is the most ideal for USafeB’s purposes.

### 3.4.2 Software Considerations

After selecting Raspberry Pi, a survey was held to determine the operating system it should work on. The important thing was for it to be lightweight so as to not consume the device’s resources and slow down its operation, and having the necessary packages that USafeB’s codebase should rely on. The following table represents a certain set of options considered for USafeB:

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Operating System** | **Base** | **Package manager** |
| Raspbian | Debian | apt |
| Ubuntu Core | Debian | apt |
| Windows IoT Core | Windows | ADK Add-ons |
| Miniban | Debian | apt |
| RaspBSD | FreeBSD | pkg-install |
| Gentoo | Independent | Portage |
| Alpine Linux | Independent | apk |

(Table 3.3: List of viable operating systems and their package managers)

The operating system requirement is less expensive to modify, so less risk is involved is flawed, thanks to the nature of Linux-based operating systems. Most of these options provide the basic requirements for the packages necessary to be easily available and for there to be no problems setting up and testing the design of USafeB.

That is a more difficult task to achieve on operating systems based on BSD such as RaspBSD, use musl libraries instead of glibc such as Alpine (which does not guarantee the packages required by USafeB to be functioning properly) as well as distributions that require more fine-tuning such as Gentoo in order to function properly. A decision was made to avoid the Microsoft option as Linux-based distributions are more efficient in the lower-levels.


With that in mind, a Debian-based distribution was preferred, and Raspbian, being the most popular distribution for Raspberry Pi devices, is fitting for the task. A decision may be made to migrate to Miniban OS at a later time to improve performance.

### 3.4.2 API considerations

In order to allow USafeB to have increased ease of use and deployability, using an online API for scanning was determined to be essential. The trade-off of Internet reliability is compensated for by not having to subject the user to a cumbersome updating process, which would’ve been necessary if an offline API was chosen. The nature of malicious attacks and viruses pushes for a need to be fast when it comes to locating and patching the vulnerabilities which causes them.

In order to stay up to date with the latest trends, a decision was made to use VirusTotal’s[ref] tried and proven APIs in order to perform the scanning process.

## **3.5 Architectural Design**



(Figure 3.1: USafeB’s architectural design)

Figure 3.2 showcases USafeB’s architecture. When a user connects their USB device into USafeB’s hardware, it starts by profiling the drive and performing a few tests such as confirming its identity from its headers, determining whether that type of device is allowed or not, and checking with its local database whether its blacklisted or not.

It then uses VirusTotal API as well as its local database to inspect the drive’s contents and decide whether it should forward the drive’s contents or not.

## **3.6 Use Case Scenarios**

### 3.6.1 Connecting to the Internet

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Use case ID | 1 |
| Use case identifier | Connectivity |
| Description | The user must be able to connect to the Internet. |
| Primary scenario | 1. User powers up USafeB 2. An Internet connection is established |

### 3.6.2 Accepted device

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Use case ID | 2 |
| Use case identifier | Safe |
| Description | There were no signs of maliciousness on the scanned device. |
| Primary scenario | 1. User inserts their device into USafeB 2. After the scanning process, the device is declared safe 3. Data is forwarded to their host device |

### 3.6.3 Rejected device


|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Use case ID | 3 |
| Use case identifier | Unsafe |
| Description | There were no signs of maliciousness on the scanned device. |
| Primary scenario | 1. User inserts their device into USafeB 2. After the scanning process, the device is declared unsafe. 3. Data is not forwarded to the host device. |

### 3.6.4 Extracting unmalicious files from a rejected device

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Use case ID | 4 |
| Use case identifier | Retrieval |
| Description | The user wishes to retrieve unmalicious data from an unsafe device. |
| Primary scenario | 1. User inserts their device into USafeB 2. After the scanning process, the device is declared unsafe 3. The user decides to retrieve files that were not deemed malicious 4. Data is forwarded to the device, but with flagged files made inoperable. |

## **3.7 Detailed Design**

### 3.7.1 Hardware design



(Figure 3.2. Physical design of USafeB)

Figure 3.2 outlines the physical hardware design of USafeB. The circuit fulfills the goals described in Section 3.2 by disallowing the physical wires connecting the USB drive to the host from reaching its destination until it’s allowed by the Pi-based software controller.

At first the USB flash drive power lines are directly connected to the Raspberry PI and the data lines are connected through the 2-channel relay module which is controlled by the raspberry PI. At the second stage, a branch is taken from the USB flash drive to the 4-channel relay board controlled by the Raspberry Pi which is connected to the Host machine.

The relaying mechanism is as follows:

1. When the USB device is attached to the USB slot the Raspberry PI opens the switch of the 2-channel relay module allowing the flow of data from the USB flash drive to the Raspberry PI
2. Further profiling and analysis is done onto the USB flash drive executing the USafeB functions
3. The resulting state is one of two based on whether the USB flash drive is flagged safe or malicious:

* Safe case: The Raspberry PI closes the switch of the 2-channel relay board and opens the channel relay board allowing the data flow from USB device to the host machine while disabling the route of the USB flash drive to the Pi-based controller.
* Malicious case: The raspberry PI blacklists the device and closes the switches of both relay modules disabling all routes of the USB flash device, disallowing further connectivity.

### 3.7.2 Software design

## **3.8 Conclusion**

The previous sections should have given the reader the awareness necessary to follow through with the implementation details of the following chapter. The project’s overall form was outlined along with the key considerations shadowing it, use-cases were presented as well as an illustration of its architecture and detailed designs. The upcoming chapters will deal with the realization, findings and performance evaluation of the requirements outlined above.